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Summary
This article critiques the dominant view that human rights do not bind 
non-state actors. It ties the dominant discourse to the natural rights 
theory and, to a lesser extent, the positivist school of thought. A critique 
of these traditions reveals that there are no insurmountable philosophical 
barriers to recognising the application of human rights to non-state actors 
and the private sphere. Drawing on Marxist and feminist philosophical 
schools, as well as African conceptions of human rights, it argues that 
the view that non-state actors should be bound by human rights can be 
defended philosophically. The article ends with an analysis of the various 
options through which human rights obligations of non-state actors may 
be enforced within a domestic constitutional framework.
1 Introduction 
The question whether non-state actors should be bound by human 
rights is one of the most current issues in comparative international 
and constitutional law. Interest in this issue has been heightened in the 
context of globalisation, which has witnessed the rise of new actors 
(such as transnational corporations (TNCs), international financial 
institutions and multilateral organisations) on the international and 
domestic scenes with powers akin to, and in some cases dwarfing, 
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those of states.1 Nowadays these actors influence government policies 
concerning the provision of social services and goods and political 
process, and have increasingly also participated in the provision of 
basic services through privatisation.2 Furthermore, non-state actors, 
like states, often violate human rights severally or in complicity with 
states.3 
However, the human rights doctrine has thus far not helped much 
in resolving the human rights challenges posed by non-state actors. 
Very few constitutions recognise the application of the Bill of Rights to 
non-state actors,4 and progress towards the adoption of human rights 
standards for TNCs and other business enterprises5 hit a snag in 2005 
following the dissolution of the mandate of the Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in this area and the 
appointment in the same year of a nominal position of Special Repre-
sentative for the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.
Central to the reluctance to recognise the obligations of non-state 
actors in relation to human rights is the age-old notion that human 
rights bind states only, not non-state actors. This article attributes this 
thinking mainly to the natural rights theory and, to some extent, the 
positivist school. It will therefore critique these theories with a view to 
providing a theoretical basis for recognising the applicability of human 
rights to non-state actors and the private sphere. In doing so, it will 
draw on the Marxist and feminist jurisprudential schools as well as 
African conceptions of rights. The final section of the article explores 
the emerging models for extending the application of human rights to 
non-state actors and the private sphere, which reflect a departure from 
the strictures of the natural rights and positivist schools.
1 For the impact of globalisation on state sovereignty, see P Alston ‘The myopia of the 
handmaidens: International lawyers and globalization’ (1997) 8 European Journal of 
International Law 435; M Reisman ‘Designing and managing the future of the state’ 
(1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 409 412; S Sur ‘The state between 
fragmentation and globalization’ (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 421 
422.
2 In Southern Africa, eg, a number of TNCs have been involved in the provision of 
such important basic services as water and electricity. See generally D McDonald & 
G Ruiters (eds) The age of commodity: Water privatization in Southern Africa (2005); 
DM Chirwa ‘Privatisation of water in Southern Africa: A human rights perspective’ 
(2004) 4 African Human Rights Law Journal 218.
3 See, eg, D Orentlicher & T Gelatt ‘Public law, private actors: The impact of human 
rights on business investors in China’ (1993) 14 Northwest Journal of International 
Law and Business 1 66; L Saunders ‘Rich and rare are the gems they war: Holding De 
Beers accountable for trading conflict diamonds’ (2001) 24 Fordham International 
Law Journal 1402. 
4 The exceptions in Africa are Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Malawi and South 
Africa.
5 See UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Busi-
ness Organisations with Regard to Human Rights, UN ESCOR, 55th session, Agenda 
Item 4, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub2/2003/12/Rev.2.
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2 Philosophical approaches supporting vertical 
application
2.1 Natural rights theory
The natural rights theory is the tradition most intricately linked to the 
state-centric application of human rights.6 Developed in the seven-
teenth to eighteenth centuries, this theory was premised on the belief 
that the state formed part of ‘a divine strategy’ and was therefore 
‘natural’.7 However, the concern about individual security and free-
dom in a stateless society prompted theorists of the time to design a 
theoretical justification for the institution of the state whose primary 
purpose was to provide security and protect individual freedom.8 This 
was achieved by conceptualising the relationship between the state 
and the individual in terms of a social contract. To avoid the chaos that 
would implode under the weight of unlimited individual freedom, John 
Locke theorised that individuals has to submit to the body politic while 
retaining their civil rights of life, liberty and property.9 The exercise of 
political power by a government was in turn contingent upon the dis-
charge of the obligation to respect these natural rights of individuals. 
In so doing, this theory produced two spheres — the public sphere 
involving the relationship between the state and the individual and the 
private sphere involving individuals inter se.
The twin principles of state sovereignty and liberalism, which were 
both gaining ground at the time the natural rights theory was for-
mulated, influenced the development of the distinction between the 
public and the private within the natural rights theory.10 According to 
Steiner and Alston:11
It is partly the prominence of the rights related to notions of individual 
liberty, autonomy and choice and the right related to property protection 
that produces the sharp divisions in much liberal thought between the state 
and the individual, between the government and nongovernmental sec-
tors, between what are often referred to as the public and private realms or 
spheres of action.
6 GE Frug ‘The city as a legal concept’ (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review 1059 1099-
1100.
7 S Avineri Hegel’s theory of the modern state (1972) 177; A Gillespie ‘Ideas of human 
rights in antiquity’ (1999) 17 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 233 251. 
8 H Steiner & P Alston ‘Comment on some characteristics of the liberal political tradi-
tion’ in H Steiner & P Alston (eds) International human rights in context: Law, politics 
and morals (2000) 361 363.
9 See M Freeman ‘Is a political science of human rights possible?’ (2001) 19 Nether-
lands Quarterly of Human Rights 123 125.
10 See Frug (n 6 above) 1088. See also A Pollis ‘Towards a new universalism: Recon-
struction and dialogue’ (1998) 16 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 5 12.
11 Steiner & Alston (n 8 above) 363.
Thus, the social contract provided a legitimate basis for the rule of the 
nation-state, which was then considered the best means of protecting 
the individual from various groups contending for power, while liberal-
ism promoted individualism, economic freedom, formal autonomy and 
abstract equality. The inviolability of privacy was promoted because 
natural rights rested on the belief that individuals were autonomous 
beings capable of making rational choices.12 Consequently, the con-
duct of private actors in the private sphere fell outside the concern of 
natural rights.13 
It is immediately apparent from this discussion that the natural rights 
theory was based on the wrong assumption that people are born equal 
and free. This is a point that is well illustrated by feminist writers and the 
Marxist theory discussed later in this article. These theories converge 
on the point that the natural rights theory’s conception of equality 
ignored the impact of systemic factors that impede the full exercise by 
individuals of their freedom and make them vulnerable to victimisa-
tion by others in both the private or public spheres. Consequently, the 
natural rights theory failed to provide protection to individuals from 
such serious human rights abuses committed in the private realm as 
slavery and violence against women.14 As was noted in the introduc-
tory section, non-state actors (especially TNCs) now exert increasing 
influence on international and domestic state policies with both a 
direct and indirect impact on the enjoyment of human rights than was 
the case when this theory was being formulated. This development has 
undercut the assumption that the private sphere is made up of equal 
parties and thus bolstered the argument for extending the application 
of human rights to this sphere. 
The natural rights theory also wrongly assumed that human beings 
are entirely autonomous, self-interested and egoistic individuals. 
Again, this is a point that is well illustrated by the Marxist critique, 
which posits that private relations consist of structural socio-economic 
inequalities. Furthermore, Pollis has argued that, even during the Age 
of the Enlightenment, ‘men and women were’, at a minimum, ‘in a 
complex web of interpersonal relationships which included reciprocal 
rights and obligations’.15 African conceptions of society, as will be 
shown below, support a conception of human rights which pays hom-
age to the notion of individual duties to one another.
The view that individuals are not egocentric but that they live in a 
society where they depend on and owe obligations to one another can 
be said to be consistent with the rationale behind the social contract 
12 D Sidorsky ‘Contemporary reinterpretations of the concept of human rights’ in 
D Sidorsky (ed) Essays on human rights: Contemporary rights and Jewish perspectives 
(1979) 89.
13 Steiner & Alston (n 8 above) 363.
14 See R Gaete Human rights and the limits of critical reason (1993) 114.
15 Pollis (n 10 above) 10.
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itself. As originally conceived, the natural rights theory held that natu-
ral rights existed independently from the state since they predate the 
state. The formation of a limited government can therefore be seen 
as an implicit acknowledgment of the duty of individuals to exercise 
rights responsibly in order to avoid inflicting harm on each other. While 
the natural rights theory regards the state as the natural means of 
protecting rights, the social contract can be regarded as having tacitly 
endorsed the fundamental obligation on the part of every individual 
not to interfere with the freedom of another. This is a fundamental obli-
gation on the part of everyone, which, if observed universally, would 
render the state’s duty to protect rights irrelevant.16 The argument for 
the application of human rights in the private sphere therefore rein-
forces the recognition of duties that private actors owe one another for 
them to coexist in harmony and peace, which arguably necessitate the 
conclusion of the social contract in the first place. 
It can therefore be argued that the public/private distinction in the 
application of human rights not only arose at a time when it was con-
textually required, but that it was also based on wrong assumptions 
about the nature of human beings and how they relate to each other. 
The realisation that private relations are not constituted by equal par-
ties and the fact that non-state actors possess enormous powers in 
contemporary times demand a rethink of this divide.
2.2 Positivism 
Positivism endorses the public/private divide in its application of human 
rights because of the prominence it gives to the state in the protection 
of rights. Although the definition of positivism varies from one theo-
rist to another,17 the central theme is simple: Law is what it is and not 
what it ought to be. In other words, the law is what can be ascertained 
though a state’s legal processes. Bentham, for one, considered law as 
‘[a]n assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or adopted 
by the sovereign in a state, concerning conduct to be observed by a 
certain person or class of persons, who are supposed to be subject to 
his power’.18 Likewise, Austin stated that the science of jurisprudence 
‘is concerned with positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, as 
considered without regard to their goodness or badness’.19 In demon-
strating that law was equivalent to a legal system, Kelsen also brought 
the positivists school firmly within the state machinery.20
16 H Shue Subsistence, affluence, and US foreign policy (1980) 55.
17 HLA Hart ‘Positivism and the separation of law and morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law 
Review 601 n 25.
18 J Bentham ‘An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation’ in C Morris 
(ed) The great legal philosophers: Selected readings in jurisprudence (1959) 262 278.
19 J Austin The province of jurisprudence determined (HLA Hart ed) (1954) 126.
20 See generally H Kelsen Introduction to the problems of legal theory (trans BL Paulson 
& SL Paulson) (1992). 
It is from positive laws that legal rights emanate according to the 
positivist school. Thus, on the basis that natural rights originated from 
imaginary law, Bentham ridiculed them categorically as ‘nonsense 
upon stilts’.21 To underscore the inseparable connection between the 
state and human rights, Hart, a more contemporary positivist, stated 
that ‘[g]overnment among men exists not because men have rights 
prior to government which government is to preserve, but because 
without government and law men have no rights and can have none’.22 
The positivist school, therefore, defines human rights as those that the 
state has recognised through positive law. One cannot look beyond 
state law to discover human rights.
It can therefore be seen that the positivist tradition associates the 
source of human rights closely with the state. This theory reinforces the 
role of the state in protecting human rights. To this extent, the positiv-
ist doctrine joins paths with the natural rights theory in that they both 
tacitly and expressly consider the state as the principal mechanism of 
protecting rights. Since the state confers rights, those rights must bind 
it.
However, it must be noted that while positivism provides a basis for 
determining rights, it does not provide any further theoretical frame-
work to determine the content of rights and how they must apply. 
This is so because of its insistence on the distinction between law and 
morality.23 This distinction enables the positivist theory to hold that 
human rights are only those rights granted by the state. Morality has 
no relevance in the determination of what human rights are. It can play 
a role in informing law reform or which new rights to recognise, but it 
does not assist in the determination of what is law. 
Without such a basis, it is possible for the state to grant rights to 
individuals or groups in both the private and public domains as long 
as such application is authorised by positive law. For example, the 
South African Constitution, as noted earlier, expressly recognises the 
horizontal application of human rights. The validity of such a provision 
can only be based on the enactment of such a provision in compliance 
with the state processes of enacting law and not on some moral or 
other basis. Since this provision was adopted within a legitimate and 
legal process, this theory would consider it to be valid. At the same 
time, the positivist tradition would also validate the constitutional posi-
tion in Canada, which restricts the application of human rights to state 
action and allows a very limited application to conduct of non-state 
21 Quoted in AJ Sebok Legal positivism in American jurisprudence (1998) 30.
22 HLA Hart ‘Utilitarianism and natural rights’ in HLA Hart (ed) Essays in jurisprudence 
and philosophy (1983) 182.
23 Modern adherents to the positivist school at least concede that inner morality is 
essential to every legal system, but they do not agree on what constitutes that inner 
morality. See JP Maniscalco ‘The new positivism: An analysis of the role of morality in 
jurisprudence’ (1995) 68 Southern California Law Review 989.
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actors.24 There is therefore a danger implicit in this theory’s reliance on 
procedures of law making and the lack of the recognition of the role of 
morality in determining the validity of law. It is that this theory can act 
as a great resource to justify the status quo.25 
In short, the positivist theory provides the criteria for determining 
the source of rights but it does not provide a benchmark to determine 
what the content of rights should be and how they should apply. While 
it clearly supports the position that the state is the primary bearer of 
the obligation to protect human rights, it does not provide a basis to 
restrict their application to states only. 
3 Theories that support horizontal application
3.1 The Marxist critique 
One of the enduring contributions of Marxism lies in its critique of the 
public/private dichotomy in the application of human rights. This the-
ory advocated a contextual analysis of law, human rights and society. 
Rights, according to Marx, could not be eternal or immutable because 
they took shape within a particular historical context.26 He contended 
that rights ‘can never be higher than the economic structure of society 
and its cultural development conditioned thereby’.27 He argued that 
‘[n]one of the supposed rights of man goes beyond the egoistic man 
… an individual withdrawn behind his private interests and whims and 
separate from the community’.28
Marxists also held that the state was a reflection of unequal con-
ditions.29 The state in a capitalist environment, Marxists argued, was 
an institution of compulsion, oppression and exploitation by the 
bourgeoisie of the working majority. In essence, the Marxist critique 
highlighted the fact that the concept of human rights and the institu-
tion of the state can serve the interests of those that are powerful in 
society or legitimise systemic and other economic inequalities in the 
private sphere. This is a concern that is raised precisely by the question 
of the non-state actors’ responsibility for human rights currently. 
The Marxist school expressly embraced the notion of duties of indi-
viduals to the community. Unger has observed that ‘the interests of 
the individual’ in a socialist conception of rights ‘are subordinate to 
24 See Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 
573 595.
25 IG Shivji The concept of human rights in Africa (1989) 48.
26 C Sypnowich The concept of socialist law (1990) 88.
27 K Marx ‘Critique of the Gotha programme’ in R Tucker (ed) The Marx-Engels reader 
(1978) 528.
28 K Marx ‘On the Jewish question’ in D McLellan (ed) Karl Marx: Selected writings 
(1971) 54.
29 RWM Dias Jurisprudence (1985) 398.
those of society and, in particular, to the collective enterprise of build-
ing socialism … and that the rights of the individual are inseparably 
linked to his duties’.30 Bloch has stated similarly that ‘[t]he solidar-
ity of socialism … signifies that the “human” in “human rights” no 
longer represents the egoistic individual, but the socialist individual 
who, according to Marx’s prophecy, has transformed his forces propres 
into a social and political force’.31 Natural rights, argued Marx, con-
cerned themselves exclusively with political emancipation as opposed 
to human emancipation.32 As a result, man was reduced on the one 
hand to ‘a member of civil society, an egoistic and independent indi-
vidual’ and to ‘a citizen, a moral person’ on the other hand.33 While 
in the public (political) sphere individuals were treated as communal 
beings, argued Marx, the private sphere became the arena for degrad-
ing others.34 This prompted him to remark that ‘[t]he recognition of 
the rights of man by the modern state has only the same significance 
as the recognition of slavery by the state in antiquity’.35 He therefore 
submitted that the distinction between private law and public law was 
misconceived, arguing that ‘man must recognise his own forces as 
social forces, organise them, and thus no longer separate social forces 
from himself in the form of political forces’.36 
However, it must be mentioned that Marxists did not call for the 
horizontal application of human rights. They instead envisaged the 
emergence of a strong state, after the revolution by the working class, 
which would control the distribution of resources in the transition 
(socialism) to a classless society (communism).37 During the transi-
tion, the state would determine what rights to guarantee with a strong 
emphasis on individual duties to the community.38 The state would 
therefore regulate private conduct for the benefit of everyone. Thus, it 
can be seen that Marxism did not envisage a situation where non-state 
actors would have had as much influence as they do currently because 
freedom and formal equality in the private sphere would be curtailed 
to give effect to the notion that every individual has duties to the com-
munity in which he or she lives.
Nevertheless, as a theory, the Marxist school directly challenged the 
distinction between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’, arguing that such 
30 AL Unger Constitutional development in the USSR: A guide to the Soviet constitutions 
(1984) 274.
31 E Bloch Natural law and human dignity (trans DJ Schmidt) (1986) 178.
32 Marx (n 28 above) 57.
33 As above.
34 See K Marx ‘The holy family’ in TB Bottomore & M Rubel (eds) Karl Marx: Selected 
writings in sociology and social philosophy (1963) 224.
35 As above.
36 Marx (n 28 above) 57.
37 As above.
38 Unger (n 30 above) 274.
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distinctions helped to blur the structural socio-economic inequalities in 
society. Although it was premised on the ideal of a strong socialist state 
to regulate private and public conduct before a classless society could 
be achieved, it expressly conceded that individuals were not as equal 
and autonomous as made out by the natural rights theory. 
3.2 The feminist critique
Feminism has been at the forefront in critiquing the public/private 
distinction in the application of human rights and the law generally.39 
Feminist theorists argue that this distinction is ‘aggressively male’ and 
masks the subordination of women to men in the so-called private 
sphere.40 Pateman succinctly contends:41
The separation of the ‘paternal’ from political rule, or the family from the 
public sphere, is also the separation of women from men through the 
subjection of women to men. The fraternal social contract creates a new 
modern patriarchal order that is presented as divided into two spheres: civil 
society or the universal sphere of freedom, equality, individualism, reason, 
contract and impartial law — the realm of men or ‘individuals’; and the 
private world of particularity, natural subjection, ties of blood, emotion, 
love and sexual passion — the world of women in which men also rule.
Feminists contend that infractions in the private sphere affect women 
more than men, who are in most cases the oppressors.42 Consequently, 
the public/private divide serves the interests of men who dominate 
the public sphere and fear oppression from the state, but it does not 
benefit women who do not participate much in the public sphere and 
suffer oppression in both the private and public domains.43 According 
to Charlesworth, the law has been used to exclude women from the 
public sphere — from professions, from the market place, from the vote 
— but it has not regulated the areas of social, economic and moral life, 
which encompass the family, home and sexuality, and are associated 
with women.44 As a result, such abuses as domestic violence and rape 
committed in the home, for example, are rarely the subject of state 
intervention or legal regulation while the same acts when committed 
39 C Pateman ‘Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy’ in SI Benn & GF Gaus 
(eds) Public and private in social life (1983) 281. 
40 See eg R Lister Citizenship: Feminist perspectives (1997). See also C Romany ‘Women 
as aliens: A feminist critique of the public/private distinction in international human 
rights law’ (1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 87 100-103.
41 C Pateman The disorder of women: Democracy, feminism and political theory (1989) 
43.
42 See AX Fellmeth ‘Feminism and international law: Theory, methodology, and sub-
stantive reform’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 658 668.
43 As above.
44 H Charlesworth ‘Worlds apart: Public/private distinctions in international law’ in 
M Thornton (ed) Public and private: Feminist legal debates (1995) 243 245-246. See 
also P Hunt Reclaiming social rights: International and comparative perspectives (1996) 
86.
by state actors attract legal responsibility.45 In view of these arguments, 
feminists argue that the public/private distinction in the application of 
human rights and the law generally is undesirable.
In conclusion, the feminist critique challenges the characterisation 
of the private sphere as involving equal and free parties by showing 
that women have been treated historically as second-rate citizens and 
have suffered a wide range of abuses in the private sphere. The feminist 
critique cogently supports the recognition of the horizontal applica-
tion of human rights.
3.3 African conceptions 
African conceptions of human rights lend support to the idea of human 
rights obligations for non-state actors.46 Studies of certain ethnic 
groups in Africa reveal that these societies afforded limited protection 
of what are now called human rights. The concept of human rights 
in Africa was communitarian in the sense that it provided protection 
based on ascribed status and membership of the community,47 and 
sought a vindication of communal well-being.48 However, individual 
rights were also recognised.49 
Significantly, African societies conceived of guarantees of human 
rights as embodying individual obligations. The basis of the right/duty 
dialectic lay in the African notion that an individual formed an integral 
part of the community.50 According to Ibhawoh:51
For every right to which a member of society was entitled, there was a 
corresponding communal duty. Expressed differently, ‘the right of one kin-
ship member was the duty of the other and the duty of the other kinship 
45 See C Bunch ‘Women’s rights as human rights: Toward a revision of human rights’ 
(1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 486 489-491; DQ Thomas & ME Beasley ‘Domestic 
violence as a human rights issue’ (1993) Human Rights Quarterly 36 40; UA O’Hare 
‘Realising human rights for women’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 364 369.
46 Some have argued that African societies did not know human rights before colonial-
ism. See eg RE Howard & J Donnelly ‘Human dignity, human rights, and political 
regimes’ in J Donnelly (ed) Universal human rights in theory and practice (1989) 89. 
For a contrary view, see M Mutua ‘The Banjul Charter: The case for an African cultural 
fingerprint’ in AA An-Na’im (ed) Cultural transformation and human rights in Africa 
(2002) 68 78; T Fernyhough ‘Human rights and pre-colonial Africa’ in R Cohen et al 
(eds) Human rights and governance in Africa (1993) 40; CC Mojekwu ‘International 
human rights: The African perspective’ in JL Nelson & VM Green (eds) International 
human rights: Contemporary issues (1980) 85 86.
47 Mojekwu (n 46 above) 86.
48 JAM Cobbah ‘African values and the human rights debate: An African perspective’ 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 309 321.
49 Eg the rights to life, land, marriage, personal freedom, fair trial, welfare, conscience 
and association See K Gyekye An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan 
conceptual scheme (1987) 154; Fernyhough (n 46 above) 39 76.
50 J Mbiti African religions and philosophy (1970) 141.
51 B Ibhawoh ‘Cultural relativism and human rights: Reconsidering the Africanist dis-
course’ (2001) 19 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 43 53-54.
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member was the right of another’. Although certain rights attached to the 
individual by virtue of birth and membership to the community, there were 
also corresponding communal duties and obligations. 
Julius Nyerere also observed that common obligations among African 
societies of individuals to others, their families, and the communities 
included: deference to age because a long life was generally associated 
with wisdom and knowledge; solidarity with fellow human beings, 
especially in times of need; and reciprocity in labour issues and for 
generosity.52 
Rights and duties in Africa were inseparable. They served to highlight 
the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the community 
to which he or she belonged. A combination of rights and duties was 
necessary to achieve and maintain unity, cohesion and viability.53 These 
rights and obligations were not framed as legal entitlements because 
African societies did not make clear-cut distinctions between morality, 
religious values and laws, which all formed part of a ‘homogenous 
cosmology’.54 However, they were enforceable within the existing pro-
cedures of societies.55 
The notion of individual duties has been integrated in both the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) and the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Chil-
dren’s Charter).56 While the extent to which emphasis can be placed 
on these duties relative to rights will remain a topic of debate,57 it is 
clear that human rights conceptions in Africa lend credence to the call 
for the obliteration of the public/private divide in the application of 
human rights. 
4 Horizontal application in practice
Having thus far provided the philosophical justification for the hori-
zontal application of human rights, this article will now provide an 
overview of the emerging constitutional practices regarding the appli-
cation of human rights to non-state actors and in the private sphere. 
52 Mutua (n 46 above) 75.
53 Mutua (n 46 above) 81.
54 Ibhawoh (n 51 above) 46.
55 As above. The communitarian conception of rights is not exclusive to pre-colonial 
African societies. Pollis notes that the values of human dignity and humanity also 
existed in Confucianism and Buddhism. In these societies, a community was respon-
sible for ensuring ‘the survival and security needs both of its members and those 
outside the communal group’, ‘for without this there was no human dignity’. See 
Pollis (n 10 above) 16.
56 See arts 27-29 and 20 & 31 respectively.
57 See eg HWO Okoth-Ogendo ‘Human rights and peoples’ rights: What point is Africa 
trying to make?’ in Cohen et al (n 46 above) 74 79. 
The aim is to find practical methods of enforcing human rights against 
non-state actors.
4.1 The doctrine of state responsibility
Constitutions that adhere strictly to the traditional view that non-state 
actors cannot be bound by human rights do not recognise that the 
state has positive obligations in relation to human rights. The Consti-
tution of the United States of America is a case in point. Under this 
Constitution, a state can only be held responsible for a human rights 
violation where the conduct leading to the violation can be classified 
as ‘state action’.58 This viewpoint reflects an extreme strand of natural 
law, which considers human rights obligations as negative injunctions 
against the state — all that is required of the state is to refrain from 
interfering with individual freedom.
The doctrine of state responsibility constitutes an acknowledg-
ment that non-interference is not enough to ensure the protection of 
human rights, more especially because human rights may be violated 
by non-state actors. To curb such violations, the state must take posi-
tive measures. This idea has its origin in international law. Originally 
intended to protect the rights of aliens, it has been developed to 
impose state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts generally, 
committed by state and non-state actors.59 
In international human rights law, this doctrine has metastasised into 
the duty to protect, which posits that the state has the obligation to take 
positive steps to protect citizens and other people within its jurisdiction 
from violations that may be perpetrated by private actors.60 It entails 
that the state should prevent violations, regulate non-state actors or 
investigate violations when they occur, prosecute the perpetrators and 
provide redress to victims.61 
This duty is not absolute because states cannot be found liable for 
every human rights violation that occurs in private. The state will 
only be found responsible where it fails to exercise due diligence to 
58 See HC Strickland ‘The state action doctrine and the Rehnquist Court’ (1991) 18 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 587 645, noting that ‘[t]he state generally has 
no constitutional obligation to intervene in private disputes either to protect indi-
viduals from harm inflicted by other private entities or to force the wrongful private 
entities to compensate the victims of their wrongdoing’.
59 I Brownlie System of the law of nations: State responsibility: Part 1 (1983) 9; Phosphates 
in Morocco (Italy v France) (Preliminary Objections) [1938] PCIJ (Ser A/B) No 74 28; 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
(Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3. 
60 H Shue Basic rights: Subsistence, affluence, and US foreign policy (1980) 55; A Eide 
‘Economic, social and cultural rights as legal rights’ in A Eide et al (eds) Economic, 
social cultural rights: A textbook (1995) 21 37.
61 DM Chirwa ‘The doctrine of state responsibility as a potential means of making 
private actors accountable for human rights’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of Interna-
tional Law 1 13-14.
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prevent the violation or react to it. This test was developed by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras,62 
where the state was found responsible for the disappearances of more 
than 100 persons in Honduras. In finding the government liable, the 
Court stated that a human rights violation which is initially not directly 
imputable to a state can lead to international responsibility of the state 
‘not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence 
to prevent the violation or to respond to it’.63 
The due diligence test was applied in the SERAC case64 by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), in 
which Nigeria was found responsible for violations of a range of rights 
recognised in the African Charter committed by the state itself and oil 
companies in Ogoniland.
At the domestic level, South Africa offers an example where state 
responsibility has been invoked to address human rights wrongs perpe-
trated by non-state actors. In Camichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Another,65 the Constitutional Court held that a recommendation 
by the police to release a person accused of rape, who had a history 
of assaults, on bail could give rise to state responsibility for the assault 
committed by the accused person while on bail. It stated that South 
Africa had a duty ‘to prohibit all gender-based discrimination that has 
the effect or purpose of impairing the enjoyment by women of funda-
mental rights and freedoms and to take reasonable and appropriate 
measures to prevent the violation of those rights’.66
Essentially, the doctrine of state responsibility reinforces the role of 
the state as the primary duty-bearer in relation to human rights. How-
ever, it has redefined that role from a non-interventionist one to an 
interventionist one as required by the Marxist and feminist schools of 
thought. In holding the state responsible, the state is compelled to take 
measures such as the enactment of legislation and the establishment 
of regulatory and monitoring mechanisms aimed at preventing occur-
rences of human rights violations in the private sphere. In the end, 
non-state actors assume indirect obligations regarding human rights. 
However, this doctrine does not solve all the problems posed by 
non-state actors in relation to human rights. As noted earlier, certain 
non-state actors, especially MNCs, have become as powerful as, or 
more powerful than states, while many states, especially those in 
the developing world, have increasingly lost the capacity to control 
or regulate these actors due to a range of reasons, including resource 
constraints, dependency on corporations, corruption and the fluidity 
62 [1988] Inter-Am Court HR (Ser C) No 4.
63 n 62 above, para 172.
64 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Another (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 
2001).
65 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC).
66 n 65 above, para 63.
of certain non-state actors.67 Where a non-state actor has the capac-
ity to redress the violation itself, it does not make sense to hold the 
state alone responsible. This is particularly the case where the non-
state actor derives a financial or other benefit from the violation. More 
importantly, the doctrine of state responsibility does not hold the state 
responsible for every human rights violation committed by non-state 
actors. The state will be exonerated from responsibility if it establishes 
that it exercised due diligence to prevent the violation and to respond 
to them. This means that many violations of human rights may not be 
accounted for by the state.
It is therefore critical that state responsibility should be regarded as 
a minimum means of holding non-state actors accountable for human 
rights and should be complemented with other devices.
4.2 Indirect application through private law
Human rights can be enforced against private actors through private 
law. This idea is best exemplified by the so-called Drittwirkung doctrine 
developed by German courts, which literally means ‘third party effect’. 
German courts have held that basic rights under the German Constitu-
tion establish an objective order of values, which must influence the 
development of private law. It dictates that ‘[e]very provision of private 
law must be compatible with this system of values, and every such 
provision must be interpreted in its spirit’.68 In German practice, these 
rights influence the development of private law through the provisions 
of that law which contain mandatory rules of law forming part of the 
ordre public.69 These are rules which ‘for reasons of the general welfare 
also are binding on private legal relationships and are removed from 
the dominion of private intent’.70 They include such general phrases as 
‘good faith’, ‘public good’, ‘good morals’, and ‘reasonableness’.
The landmark Lüth case71 illustrates the application of the Drittwirkung 
doctrine. A firm director had been granted an injunction restraining an 
activist from urging the German public not to see a movie produced by 
a former producer of anti-Semitic films during the Nazi regime and ask-
ing theatre owners and distributors not to show or distribute the film. 
The injunction was granted by the lower court on the ground that the 
actions of the activist amounted to actionable incitement under article 
826 of the German Civil Code. The injunction was quashed by the 
Federal Constitutional Court on the ground that the lower court had 
failed to consider the basic right to freedom of opinion when granting 
67 See Chirwa (n 61 above) 26-28 33-35.
68 Lüth case (1958), 7 BVerfGE 198. The facts and holding as discussed herein are based 
on the English translation of the case in DP Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 361-368.
69 n 68 above, 363.
70 As above. 
71 As above.
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the injunction in favour of the film director. It stated that ‘where the 
formation of public opinion on a matter important to the general wel-
fare is concerned, private and especially individual interests must, in 
principle, yield’.72 In essence, the German Civil Code was interpreted 
against the backdrop of the right to freedom of opinion. 
The Drittwirkung doctrine has been adopted by courts in Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland and Japan,73 and by the European Court of Human 
Rights.74 It has also been codified in the South African Constitution in 
sections 8(3) and 39(2).75 
The Drittwirkung doctrine constitutes a significant departure from 
the traditional view that human rights do not bind non-state actors. It 
proceeds from the assumption that private relations, which have tradi-
tionally been regulated by private law, often involve parties who have 
unequal bargaining powers and whose freedom is affected by wide-
ranging systemic factors. It is therefore important for human rights 
to infiltrate into this arena so that the weak, vulnerable and disadvan-
taged can be given effective protection. Its greatest advantage is that it 
recognises the importance of private law (both statutory and common 
law) as a means of redressing human rights violations. Many com-
mon law actions closely approximate the claims that could be based 
on human rights provisions. For example, the common law actions 
of defamation, false imprisonment, nuisance, negligence, assault and 
battery can adequately address violations concerning the rights to 
dignity, liberty, privacy, and security of the person. Statutes are also 
often enacted to give effect to specific rights. However, it must also be 
acknowledged that not all private law principles, including legislation, 
give full effect to human rights. It is therefore important to empower 
courts to develop or interpret private law in accordance with the Bill 
of Rights so that rights are not undermined in the private sphere. By so 
doing, non-state actors become constrained by human rights and can 
be considered to be bound by them.
72 n 68 above, 367.
73 A Barak ‘Constitutional human rights and private law’ in D Friedmann & D Barak-Erez 
(eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 13 22; MJ Horan ‘Contemporary constitu-
tionalism and legal relationships between individuals’ (1976) 25 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 848 864-866.
74 A Clapham ‘The “Drittwirkung” of the Convention’ in R MacDonald et al (eds) The 
European system for the protection of human rights (1993) 163.
75 The former provides that when applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural 
or juristic person, a court ‘must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law 
to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right’. The latter provides 
that ‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights’.
4.3 Direct application 
The concept of direct responsibility is a manifestation of the full 
horizontal application of human rights. It gives full expression to the 
argument advanced in this paper that non-state actors have human 
rights obligations which can be enforced against them. Direct applica-
tion means that a victim of a human rights violation can bring a claim 
based directly on a provision in the Bill of Rights against a non-state 
actor or mount a defence to a private action based directly on a human 
right. Many factors would have to be considered before a non-state 
actor could be held directly responsible for a given human right. These 
include the nature of the right, the nature of the duty, the extent of 
the violation, the nature of the non-state actor, and the relationship 
between the non-state actor and the victim. 
The notion of direct responsibility of non-state actors has significant 
procedural advantages as it presents an opportunity to the claimant 
to bring alternative claims in one action — one based on the common 
law and another on the Constitution. It is particularly ideal where no 
private law action exists to remedy the violation alleged and have been 
allowed in Ireland. In Meskell v CIÉ, Walsh J stated that:76
[a] right guaranteed by the Constitution or granted by the Constitution can 
be protected by action or enforced by action even though such action may 
not fit into any of the ordinary forms of action in either common law or 
equity and that the constitutional right carries with it its own right to a 
remedy or for the enforcement of it.
The question that immediately arises is this: Does the claimant have 
to exhaust private law remedies before he or she can rely directly on 
a constitutional right? In Hanrahan v Merck Sharp & Dohme (Ireland) 
Ltd,77 Henchy J addressed this question thus:78
So far as I am aware, the constitutional provisions relied on have never been 
used in the courts to shape the form of any existing tort or to change the 
normal onus of proof. The implementation of those constitutional rights is 
primarily a matter for the state and the courts are entitled to intervene only 
when there has been a failure to implement or, where the implementation 
relied on is plainly inadequate, to effectuate the constitutional guarantee in 
question. In many torts — for example, negligence, defamation, trespass to 
a person or property — a plaintiff may give evidence of what he claims to 
be a breach of a constitutional right, but he may fail in the action because of 
what is usually a matter of onus of proof or because of some other legal or 
technical defence. A person may of course, in the absence of a common law 
or statutory cause of action, sue directly for breach of a constitutional right 
(see Meskell v CIÉ IR 121); but when he founds his action on an existing tort 
he is normally confined to the limitations of that tort. It might be different if 
it could be shown that the tort in question is basically ineffective to protect 
his constitutional rights.
76 [1973] 1 IR 121 134.
77 [1988] I LRM 629.
78 As above. 
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The Irish jurisprudence shows that a constitutional claim may be 
brought against a non-state actor where no private law remedy exists 
to rectify the violation or where such a remedy exists but it is inef-
fective. It must be noted, however, that courts in Ireland do not have 
the mandate to develop the common law to give effect to a provision 
in the Bill of Rights. This can be contrasted with South Africa, where 
courts have been given express powers in this regard. Nevertheless, it is 
not clear even under the South African Constitution whether the duty 
to develop the common law is broad enough to allow courts to create 
new causes of action in private law aimed at giving effect to rights. 
The ideal model of the horizontal application of a bill of rights would 
therefore seem to be one that combines both the indirect approach — 
which permits a consideration of these rights when interpreting and 
applying private law — and the direct approach — which allows victims 
of rights to bring constitutional claims against non-state actors where 
private law remedies are inadequate to address the claim or are non-
existent. To allow for the harmonious development of private law and 
constitutional law, the claimant must shoulder the burden of proving 
that a particular human rights wrong cannot be dealt with through 
private law (and the indirect application of the common law). This 
approach does not deny that human rights apply to non-state actors, 
but it rather is a pragmatic approach to effectuating the idea of the 
horizontal application of human rights. 
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, this article has argued that the state-centric application 
of human rights is an outdated concept attributable to the natural 
rights theory. The separation of the public from the private, which 
informed the manner in which rights were conceptualised within this 
doctrine, was influenced by conditions of the time which demanded 
the pursuit of liberalism and formal equality in the private sphere and 
a mechanism for restricting state interference in the private realm. To 
some extent positivist thinking lent support to the vertical application 
of human rights by defining rights as those recognised by the state. A 
critique of both these schools has revealed that they both do not pres-
ent insurmountable obstacles to redefining the application of human 
rights.
This article has demonstrated that a number of jurisprudential 
schools support the horizontal application of human rights. The first 
is the Marxist school, which exposed the potential of the natural rights 
school as a tool for powerful actors to oppress poor and often defence-
less people and also advocated for the collapsing of the distinction 
between public and private law. The second is the feminist critique, 
which has demonstrated that the public/private divide operates to 
serve the interests of men and shield non-state actors from human 
rights responsibility for abuses committed by them against women 
in the private sphere. African conceptions of human rights also lend 
credence to the recognition of binding human rights obligations of 
private actors. 
This does not mean that states will now cede their responsibilities or 
have diminished responsibilities in relation to human rights. Of course, 
states are and will remain the principal duty bearer. It is consistent 
with the ideal of the horizontal application of human rights to hold 
states responsible for failing to take measures to prevent violations of 
human rights or to respond to them. In the process, non-state actors 
become indirectly responsible for human rights. However, horizontal 
application demands that human rights should be considered when 
determining private disputes, whenever necessary. This requires that 
the private law should be subject to the Bill of Rights. Parties to private 
litigation should be allowed to call in aid human rights provisions to 
buttress their positions. Where private law remedies are non-existent, 
inadequate or ineffectual, it should be possible for claimants to bring 
direct constitutional claims, where applicable, against non-state actors. 
A combination of direct and indirect application would help to cure any 
inconsistencies between private law and human rights, narrow down 
the imaginary and illusory divide between public law and private law, 
and ultimately give full effect to the notion of the horizontal applica-
tion of human rights.
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